Vietnam and the Mercator projection

OK, I will begin with confession time. I knew of the movement against the Mercator projection due to the fact that it distorts the size of countries the further you get from the equator (the Mercator’s chief advantage being that it keeps longitudes and latitude lines straight), but I always assumed that no one actually used it as a basis to compare areas when travelling around the world (I know, I know), as I personally would rely on physical distances between point A and point B and maps of just the region when I travel. Well, this assumption was all shattered a few years ago when I met a Portuguese guy travelling through Vietnam who complained that he couldn’t cross the entire country quickly in one week; when I told him that travel speeds are most likely much lower in Vietnam, he told me he had taken that into account and thought that the length of Vietnam was similar to the length of Portugal. This is actually very far from the case – from Viana do Castelo (near the Spanish border) to Faro (on the southern coast of Portugal) is 622 km (386 miles) by road; by comparison, from Lang Son (near the Chinese border, but not the northernmost point) to Ca Mau (near the southern tip of Vietnam) is 2154 km (1338 miles) by road; a 3.5-fold difference. So I will add to the endless Internet posts already in existence comparing country sizes and show the true size of Vietnam superimposed on various regions around the world.

To start, this is Vietnam on a Mercator projection; the area of Vietnam is 331,213 km2 (127,882 mi2), which makes it the 66th largest country in the world, between Finland and Malaysia, but is very long and narrow.

As I will be matching the distance between Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon), which is 1723 km (1071 miles), here is a map of Vietnam showing the relative locations of the two cities.

I’ll start with Europe, as Europe is further from the equator and is more distorted; for comparison’s sake, Vietnam is similar in size to Finland or Germany.

Here, you can see that the distance between Hanoi and Saigon is similar to that from Rome to Berlin, and the difference in length compared to Portugal is apparent. If you shift Vietnam further west, you can see that Hanoi and Saigon also approximate London and Barcelona.

Shifting to the US, the state with the closest area to Vietnam is New Mexico; however, as Vietnam is long and narrow, distances are much greater between the two ends of the country. Here’s Vietnam on the West Coast of the US.

In this case, Hanoi and Saigon approximate Portland, OR and Los Angeles, CA (or maybe closer to San Luis Obispo). Vietnam superimposed on the Eastern US also gives similarly interesting results.

Here, Hanoi to Saigon is just short of Chicago to New Orleans. If you shift the map northward to Canada and match Saigon to Toronto, Hanoi will be in the middle of Hudson Bay.

Onward to Australia, which isn’t all that distorted on a Mercator projection in the grand scheme of things, Hanoi to Saigon stretches from Melbourne all the way up into Queensland.

Compared to New Zealand, Hanoi to Saigon is similar to Auckland to Invercargill.

Compared to Korea and Japan, Hanoi to Saigon would map to Vladivostok to Fukuoka.

Of course, even though Vietnam is long and narrow, it is still but a dwarf compared to the champion, Chile, where Hanoi to Saigon is only Antofagasta to Santiago.

And last but not least, no Mercator projection comparison is complete without Greenland. Surprise, surprise, Vietnam is still tiny compared to Greenland.

All that to say, I take back my scepticism of the significance of the importance of people judging countries’ sizes based on Mercator projection maps, and hope that these comparison will help both foreigners and Vietnamese get a sense of the relative size of Vietnam.

The divisions in the EU-Vietnam FTA ratification vote

The European Union – Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA) was ratified by the European Parliament on 12 February, 2020 in a vote in the European Parliament. Vietnam is the second largest trading partner of the EU in ASEAN, and is also the second ASEAN country to have concluded a free trade agreement with the EU (both after Singapore) after the failure of ASEAN to negotiate a bloc-wide agreement. The EVFTA was signed after three and a half years of negotiation in December 2015, and is touted as the “most modern and ambitious agreement ever concluded between the EU and a developing country”. The conclusion of this agreement is yet another major milestone for Vietnam, which already has a free trade agreement with the Eurasian Union and is a member of the CPTPP despite having been largely economically and diplomatically isolated as recently as the 1990s.

Because I am a huge nerd, right after the vote, I found the data on who voted for and against the ratification of the free trade agreement on the EU Parliament website and divided them up by both the bloc and the country they represent (the bloc data was already included in the original document, while I generated the country variable from the EU Parliament’s MEP directory), and since we’re all stuck in quarantine anyway, I thought this would be a good time to write about it. As always, I must preface this all with the caveat that I most emphatically not an expert in either European politics or legislatures in general, so this is more a case of me playing with data and commenting on trends and changes that I observed.

The European Parliament consists of 705 members is organised into parliamentary groups, similar to parties in national parliaments. Each parliamentary group consists of MEPs (Members of the European Parliament) belonging to national parties from each individual member states that share a similar ideological outlook. As of February 2020 (9th European Parliament), the voting blocs include the following:

  1. European People’s Party (EPP): A centre-right grouping consisting mostly of Christian democrats, liberal-conservatives, and conservatives; examples of member parties include the Christian Democratic Union (Christlich Demokratische Union, Germany), Fine Gael (Ireland), the Fidesz (Hungary), and the People’s Party (Partido Popular, Spain).
  2. Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D): A centre-left grouping consisting mostly of social democrats; examples of member parties include the Socialist Party (Parti socialiste, France), the Democratic Party (Partito Democratico, Italy), the Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español, Spain), and the Labour Party (Partij van der Arbeid, Netherlands).
  3. Renew Europe (Renew): a liberal, centrist, pro-European grouping; examples of member parties include the Republic on the Move (La République en Marche.(France), Citizens (Ciudadanos, Spain), the Free Democratic Party (Freie Demokratisch Partei, Germany), and Venstre (Denmark).
  4. Greens-European Free Alliance (Verts/ALE): a grouping consisting of green and regionalist parties; examples of member parties include Alliance ’90/The Greens (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, Germany), Ecolo (Belgium), the Czech Pirate Party (Česká pirátská strana, Czechia), and the Latvian Russian Union (Latvijas Krievu savienība, Latvia).
  5. Identity and Democracy (ID): a grouping consisting of nationalist, Eurosceptic, and populist parties, often described as far-right in orientation; examples of member parties include the Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, Germany), the League (Lega, Italy), National Rally (Rassemblement national, France), and the Flemish Interest (Vlaams Belang, Belgium).
  6. European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR): a grouping of centre-right, Eurosceptic, anti-federalist parties (prior to Brexit, the UK Conservative party was in this grouping); examples of member parties include Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, Poland), Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna, Sweden), Freedom and Solidarity (Sloboda a Solidarita, Slovakia), and IMRO – Bulgarian National Movement (ВМРО – Българско Национално Движение, Bulgaria).
  7. European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL): a grouping of socialist and communist parties, ranging from left-wing to far-left; examples of member parties include Syriza (Greece), La France Insoumise (France), The Left (Die Linke, Germany), Progressive Party of Working People (Ανορθωτικό Κόμμα Εργαζόμενου Λαού, Cyprus), and Podemos (Spain).
  8. Non-Inscrits (NI): the remaining MEPs who are unaffiliated with any grouping; examples of member parties include the Five Star Movement (Movimento 5 Stelle, Italy), the Communist Party of Greece (Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδας, Greece), Jobbik (Hungary), and Human Shield (Živi zid, Croatia), along with independents.

In the current European Parliament (9th European Parliament), the groupings have the following shares of seats:

From left to right: GUE/NGL (39), S&D (147), Verts/ALE (67), Renew (98), EPP (187), ECR (61), GUE/NGL (39), NI (29).

While I am not familiar with a lot of the rules or protocol of the European Parliament (or parliaments in general – legislatures are not my research focus), those who are curious about EU parliamentary procedure and vote breakdowns can peruse the EU Parliament’s website (all votes can be found at, but do note that the notation does take a little bit of getting used to). The overall breakdown of the ratification of the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement was as follows:

The website also helpfully provided a list of who voted for and against, but did not list the country that the MEP represented, so I cross-referenced the names with the European Parliament’s Directory. The percent for was calculated as the number of for votes as a percent of the total that voted (i.e. excluding abstentions).

Map of countries’ MEP votes for EVFTA ratification
GRAND TOTAL40119240633
MEP votes for EVFTA by country

Remarkably, out of the twenty-seven countries of the EU, the MEPs from twenty-four countries voted for ratification, with only Finland, France, and Italy voting against, and the margin of vote from French MEPs being substantially larger than that of Italian or Finnish MEPs. While conventional wisdom would expect old colonial ties, the existence of a large Vietnamese diaspora (the largest in Europe) in France, and strong trade ties to push for French enthusiasm for this free trade agreement, this discrepancy may be explained by the fact that the French MEPs are disproportionately dominated by the far-right populist National Rally, which is staunchly anti-free trade (Italian MEPs are similarly dominated by the far-right League). Statistically, France is the third largest European destination for Vietnamese exports (behind Germany and the Netherlands), although it is the second largest European origin of exports to Vietnam (also behind Germany); in turn, Vietnam is the fifth largest Asian origin of exports to France, behind China, Japan, Turkey, and India. Comparatively, Vietnam is the fifth largest Asian origin of exports to Germany, behind China, Japan, Turkey, and South Korea). Interestingly, Vietnam is the second largest Asian origin of imports to Slovakia, just behind China.

Among the countries that voted for, the strongest support appeared to be from Central and Eastern Europe along with other newer members of the EU, with the strongest for votes recorded from Estonia, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Malta, Cyprus, Poland, and Hungary. On the other hand, the most marginal votes were from Austria, Belgium, Ireland, Germany, and Greece. This difference may be explained by the remaining ties that the Vietnamese state has with the old Eastern Bloc as well as the overall pro-free market stance of Central and Eastern Europe along with Western European posturing on human rights. That said, these voting patterns can also be interpreted as counter-intuitive, as Vietnam’s main exports to Europe will compete in lower-wage sectors and have the potential to hurt members with lower average wages; however, this is not borne out by the voting results even beyond the new members, as MEPs from 11 out of the 12 countries with the lowest nominal GDP per capita all voted strongly for the agreement (with the exception of Greece).

BlocForAgainstAbstainTotalPercent For
GRAND TOTAL4011924063368%
Voting for the EVFTA by bloc

The voting blocs appear to be consistent with expectations. Both the centre-right blocs (EPP and ECR) voting strongly for the agreement, showing that differences on European integration do not necessarily extend to trading beyond the bloc; however, it should be noted that the ECR vote was also split by country, with five of the eight No votes from the MEPs from the Brothers of Italy party (Fratelli d’Italia) (the rest came from the lone MEP from the Bulgarian National Movement, one of the two Spanish MEPs from Vox, and a lone dissenter from Poland’s Law and Justice Party). Given that Renew is a liberal grouping, it is also not surprising that the group voted overwhelmingly for the agreement. On the left, opposition to the agreement generally stems from environmental concerns of free trade (hence the negative vote from the Verts/ALE, with a lone holdout from one of the two MEPs from the Socialist People’s Party of Denmark) or the impact on domestic labour (explaining the unanimous negative vote from GUE/NGL). The views from the centre-left also reflect these concerns, as reflected by the somewhat split vote of the S&D bloc, with S&D MEPs from France, Austria, Belgium, and Netherlands voting overwhelmingly against, the rest overwhelmingly for, and German S&D MEPs split down the middle. However, while these views are consistent with the political orientation of the blocs, Vietnam’s status as a Communist State complicates these considerations, as historically, it could count on the support and solidarity of left-wing parties in Europe; after all, Ho Chi Minh himself was a founding member of the French Communist Party. Nevertheless, these results show two important considerations. First, the votes seem to reflect domestic politics more than international relations, which is not atypical of legislative action. Second, with the waning importance of ideological divides since the end of the Cold War, it would appear Vietnam is first and foremost a trading partner, and the country’s political alignment is secondary.

While the ID group’s overall voting against the free trade agreement seems to be consistent with the group’s general orientation as being Eurosceptic and anti-globalisation and immigration, the vote was not unanimous. Notably, two-thirds (6 out of 9) of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) voted for the free trade agreement, along with the entire three-member delegation from the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ). In addition, the sole members of the Danish People’s Party (DF), the Conservative People’s Party of Estonia (EKRE), and the Freedom and Direct Democracy Party of Czechia (SPD) also voted for the agreement. This meant that they diverged the other right-wing populist movements around Europe, who appear to be uniformly staunchly protectionist on this issue. This vote is also a useful reminder that while these parties are often grouped together as part of a broad European right-wing populist surge due to significant overlap and cooperation, they do differ considerably on some issues. Populism overall is also not a good indicator of voting patterns on ratification – the entire delegation from the Italian Five Star Movement (M5S), which falls under the NI group, voted for the agreement.

These are some very rough and non-expert impressions that I had of the ratification process. Overall, to me, the EVFTA vote is emblematic of the changing position of Vietnam in the global economy. From a country that was still under a US embargo until 1995, Vietnam has become an open trading country, with trade reaching up to 200% of GDP in recent years. The transformation is apparent both within Vietnam and around the world – as a child, I remember seeing very few imports available, and my exposure to many imported goods was through luggage brought in by friends and family who lived abroad. From the other side, when I first moved abroad, Vietnamese goods were very uncommon. Now, Vietnam is flooded with consumer goods from around the world, and Vietnamese goods from numerous sectors are ubiquitous in many markets (I even found Vietnamese instant noodles in a supermarket in Brazil). Vietnam’s global position has changed significantly, and in a way, the EVFTA shows that this also changes the way the country interacts with domestic actors around the world.

Reflections on Điện Biên Phủ

Like generations of Vietnamese school children, I was taught from a young age that the Battle of Dien Bien Phu, where Viet Minh forces defeated the French Empire, “shook the globe”. As children, we are all familiar with the sense of pride as we see the famous photo of the flag of the Viet Minh flying over the headquarters of the French forces in the valley at Dien Bien Phu. It was, after all, possibly the most prominent example of an indigenous army in a colony defeating an imperial power in a conventional modern battle and marked the end of the First Indochina War and the collapse of French Indochina. The war was not kind to Vietnam – in addition to the military losses, the French also made an effort to destroy priceless cultural relics that had little military value, beginning with much of the Imperial City of Hue (including the priceless scrolls in the Imperial Library) upon reoccupying the country in 1946 (aided by the British, who were tasked with disarming the Japanese south of the 16th parallel) and ending with the One-Pillar Pagoda in Hanoi as they withdrew – the pagoda had been constructed in 1049. More than simply smashing the myth of French military supremacy – after all, the French Empire was defeated even when 80% of the French war effort was being funded by the United States – the First Indochina War was the final nail on the coffin for French claims of cultural and moral superiority; after all, such wanton destruction inflicted by a losing army seeking to reimpose control over a colony spoke not of dignity or cultural refinement, but rather of a desperate moral bankruptcy.

But I write this not as an attempt to list the crimes of French colonial system; the sins are self-evident and have been enumerated by much better scholars. The legacy of Dien Bien Phu extends much further than its influence shaping the political future of Vietnam. Paradoxically, I never truly understood Dien Bien Phu’s impact on the rest of the world until I left Vietnam. Even as we commemorate almost sixty years since the battle, the memory of it lives on beyond our shores. I still remember the first moment I realised this, when I talked to an old Algerian couple on the shores of the Red Sea in Egypt. When they had heard that I was from Vietnam, they immediately recounted to me their memory of receiving the news of Dien Bien Phu on that fateful day in May 1954. The man told me he still remembered waking up to the news as a teenager and what it symbolised for Algeria. The French Empire in all its might was defeated by some indigènes in Indochina! The names Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap were on everybody’s lips. If it could happen in Indochina, it could happen in Algeria! Dien Bien Phu became a beacon for decolonisation all over the world. I felt pride mingled with humility and awe with this realisation. We fought to liberate ourselves, yet our actions had great repercussions for the rest of the world. Even as we struggle in our corner of the world, we do not stand alone, and our struggle carries meaning beyond our borders. We were the fabled city on the hill, and I only hope that since then, we have managed to live up to our reputation.

It wasn’t until later that Dien Bien Phu began to carry even more meaning to me. In Vietnam, Dien Bien Phu is often talked about as the moment when we gained our political freedom. However, as I progress further in my studies and my travels, Dien Bien Phu has taken on new meaning. As I became exposed to post-colonial studies, I often found that despite coming from a former colony myself, the social structures and attitudes described in these texts often seem very foreign to me. The remaining deference to the white man despite independence did not seem reminiscent of the people I grew up with. Yet, as I travel to other former colonies, vestiges of the colonial system still lingered in many places, internalised by post-independence elites, whether through the continued use of the colonial language, the maintenance of the colonial political system, or the implicit elevation of the white foreigners above natives. It was through this experience that I realised that Dien Bien Phu did not just liberate us politically; more importantly, it liberated our minds. How could we continue to perceive Europe as superior if it could be defeated so utterly in open battle? How could Europe claim to be morally and culturally enlightened when its actions in defeat spoke of such terrible moral corruption? Through Dien Bien Phu, we as a nation found the courage to break the bonds of colonialism and smash the colonial system to reclaim our destiny. Perhaps on that day in May, we gained not just our political independence, but also a psychological freedom that allows us to perceive ourselves as an equal member of the global community. It is a freedom so complete that millions of us who grew up with it do not even realise the incredible privilege that it has brought us. We see the right to be masters of our own fate as a birth right and our self-assurance as equal to anyone in the western world to be self-evident. The rest of the twentieth century was not kind to us, but nothing could take away our dignity and our sense of self. We have been through destructive war and crushing poverty, but we remain confident in our ability to stand on our own two feet and stand proudly as an equal in the world.

Today (7th May, 2018) is the fifty-fourth anniversary of the battle, and while we commemorate the great losses we suffered during the French War, we must also remember that we freed our minds that day. That hard-gained freedom is priceless, and as we look towards the uncertainties of the future, I hope that independence continues to be an anchor for us to remind us that we are privileged in being the sole masters of our own fate.